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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
by Professor D. Schindler
The separate evolution of international humanitarian law
and of human rights
The 150th anniversary of the birth of Henry Dunant, the 30th anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 25th anniver-
sary of the European Convention on Human Rights were all celebrated
in 1978. Also in 1978, both the American Convention on Human Rights
(1969) and the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions (1977)
entered into force. The concurrence of these various notable events,
all relating to human rights, constitutes an appropriate occasion for an
analysis of the relationship which exists between international humani-
tarian law and human rights.
These two branches of international law which had been developing
separately for a long time began, after the Second World War, gradually
to approach each other, and now one largely overlaps the other. Both
have the same purpose: the protection of human beings. But they deal
with different situations and have evolved differently, and it is this
which needs to be stressed first of all.
Development of international humanitarian law
The aim of international humanitarian law, which is a branch of the
law of war or of armed conflicts, is to protect individuals who have been
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placed hors de combat or who do not take part in the conflict, and to
ensure that they are treated humanely.
In nearly all the great civilizations, already in ancient times and in
the Middle Ages, rules restricting the right of belligerents to inflict injury
on their adversaries existed. Laws for the protection of certain categories
of persons can be traced back to the Persians, Greeks and Romans, as
well as to India, the Islam, Ancient China, Africa and the Christian
States. Those categories included women, children and aged people,
disarmed combatants and prisoners. Attacks against certain objects
—places of worship for example—and treacherous means of combat,
such as the use of poison in particular, were prohibited.
The law of war in its present form evolved, mainly under the influence
of the Christian faith and the rules of chivalry, in the course of the wars
waged by the European nations against each other after the appearance
of the modern European State system. It was expressed in ordinances
issued by States to their armies, laying down what was to be the behaviour
of their troops towards the enemy, and also in bilateral pacts (cartels,
capitulations, armistices) concluded by army commanders, with the
purpose of arranging for the care of the wounded or for the exchange
of prisoners of war. The uniform character of these regulations led to
the creation of customary rules of law. The writings of publicists, such
as Grotius and Vattel, contributed to the consolidation of customary law.
But it was only in the nineteenth century, when wars were waged by
large national armies, employing new and more destructive weapons
and leaving a terrifying number of wounded lying helpless on the battle-
field, that a law of war based on multilateral conventions was developed.
It was not just a coincidence that this development took place at a time
when, in the States of the western world, common principles in respect
of human rights began to prevail. The decisive impulse to this general
trend was given by the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. It expressed
with clarity this idea of generally applicable human rights, since it
compelled the High Contracting Parties to treat equally their own
wounded and those of the enemy.
The members of the Geneva Committee, who were the sponsors of
this Convention and then continued to act under the name of Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, later directed their efforts to the
further development of international humanitarian law. In the course of
the next few decades, provisions were adopted for the protection of
other categories of persons, namely the wounded, sick and shipwrecked
members of armed forces at sea (in 1899), prisoners of war (in 1929)
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and civilians (in 1949). The Conventions were revised in 1906, 1929
and 1949, and in 1977 two Protocols supplementing the four Conventions
of 1949 were adopted.
While the Geneva Conventions deal with the protection of persons
who have fallen into the hands of an enemy (wounded, sick, prisoners of
war, civilian persons), the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 seek in
the first place to lay down the conduct of military operations. They
restrict the freedom of belligerent States to attack specified persons and
objectives and ban the use of certain methods and means of combat in
the conduct of war. Part of these rules have been re-affirmed and devel-
oped by the two 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. While the
Hague Conventions ultimately also aim to protect human beings,
humanitarian concerns are more pronounced in the Geneva Conventions,
which deal directly with problems relating to persons affected by war.
Independently of the development of international humanitarian
law, the International Committee of the Red Cross has acted also in
various other ways to protect the victims of armed conflicts and, as a
consequence, to work for the defence of human rights. It has been
entrusted by the Geneva Conventions themselves with the task of
contributing to and watching over their application; this it does mainly by
its visits to prisoners of war and civilian internees. The International
Committee has also carried out a wide range of relief operations to bring
aid to persons affected by international or non-international conflicts and
to the victims of internal strife and tension. The fact that, since the
Second World War and in situations unconnected with armed conflicts,
ICRC delegates have been able to visit in over seventy countries some
300,000 detainees unprotected by any Convention is, in the context of
the protection of human rights, an achievement of considerable impor-
tance. As a result, this protection has been extended to a category of
persons who are in a situation very similar to that of prisoners of war
or civilian internees but for whom the States are not very eager to sign
a convention because in the majority of cases these persons are nationals
of the States.
Development of human rights
Human rights and the law of war evolved along entirely different and
totally separate lines, but their spiritual roots may be traced in part to
the same origin and, from the nineteenth century, a certain degree of
similarity may be observed in the development of each. The first expres-
sions of human rights may be found in the various declarations issued
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by a number of North American States towards the end of the eighteenth
century, in particular in Virginia's Bill of Rights of 1776, and also, for
instance, in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen pronounced in 1789. These declarations marked the accom-
plishment of a long process. British constitutional history is. eloquent in
this respect. The people of England managed to wrest from the king
a certain number of rights set forth in various charters: in 1628 the
Petition of Rights, in 1679 the Habeas Corpus Act and in 1689 the Bill
of Rights. These rights could be overriden by Parliament and were not
therefore considered fundamental rights or human rights as we consider
them today. Most of them were none the less included in the human rights
declarations of the revolutionary period and in this context they were
accorded wider scope. Behind those declarations a long evolution of
ideas may be perceived. Its beginnings may be traced to the stoic philos-
ophy in Ancient Greece, a doctrine which claimed, for the first time,
equality of all human beings. This idea was central to overcoming the
obstacles constituted at the time by the isolation of peoples from each
other and the lack of any rules of law for foreigners. The conquests of
Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire lent further support to the
stoic doctrine, which later was combined with the Christian dogma that
man was made by the Creator in His own image and that all men were
equal. This concept of equality permeated natural law in the Middle
Ages and at the beginning of our modern epoch until it was finally
incorporated in the teaching of the philosophers of the Age of Reason,
on which the American and French declarations of human rights repose.
In the nineteenth century, declarations of fundamental rights were
included more and more frequently in the constitutions of States, and
today the constitutional law in nearly every country contains such
guarantees. But until the Second World War international guarantees of
this kind did not exist, if one excepts some international conventions
on particular aspects of human rights, such as the abolition of slavery
or the protection of minority groups.
At all times, human rights guarantees have primarily been concerned
with the relations between States and their own nationals in time of peace.
On the other hand, the treatment of enemy persons in wartime has always
remained outside their scope. The cleavage between human rights and
the law of war continued even when, after the Second World War,
international conventions on human rights were concluded. They, too,
govern in the first place relations between States and their own nationals.
The adoption of these conventions resulted from recognition of the fact
that the respect of human rights within every State was a condition for
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the maintenance of peace. The United Nations Secretary-General, in
his first report on "Respect for human rights in armed conflicts" {A.pi20,
para. 16), said: "The Second World War gave conclusive proof of the
close relationship which exists between outrageous behaviour of a
Government towards its own citizens and aggression against other
nations, thus, between respect for human rights and the maintenance of
peace". The relationship of human rights to internal law is the reason
why the conventions in respect of human rights have been ratified by
fewer countries than the Geneva Conventions. On 31 December 1978,
52 States were parties to the United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and 54 to the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, while 145 States had notified their accession to the
Geneva Conventions.
Relationship between international humanitarian law
and human rights after the Second World War
At the United Nations, the view held at first was that the very fact
that the law of war might be discussed within its walls would shake
world confidence in its ability to maintain peace. The United Nations
International Law Commission therefore decided, at the first meeting
it held in 1949, not to include the law of war among the subjects with
which it would concern itself. The Universal Declaration of 1948 does
not refer in any of its provisions to the question of respect for human
rights in armed conflicts. Conversely, the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which were drafted at more or less the same time, made no mention of
human rights.
All the same, unintentionally, a link was established between those
two branches of international law—the Geneva Conventions and the
human rights conventions. On the one hand, a tendency may be detected
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for their provisions to be considered
not only as obligations to be discharged by the High Contracting Parties
but as individual rights of the protected persons. An article in each of
the four Conventions provides that protected persons may not renounce
the rights secured to them by the Conventions (article 7 of the First,
Second and Third Conventions, and article 8 of the Fourth). Further-
more, article 3, which is common to all four Conventions, obliges the
Parties to apply, as a minimum, certain humanitarian rules in an armed
conflict not of an international character. It thus lays down the relations
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between the State and its own nationals and, consequently, encroaches
upon the traditional sphere of human rights. It should also be noted that
it was the influence of the human rights movement which, in the 1950's,
led to the use of the expression "international humanitarian law", when
referring to the Geneva Conventions, a term which later was extended
to cover the whole of the law of war or law of armed conflicts.
On the other hand, the human rights conventions contain provisions
for their implementation in time of war. Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights of 1950 provides that in time of war or
public emergency threatening the life of the nation certain rights contained
in the Convention may be abrogated, except for four inalienable rights
which constitute an "immutable core". Similar provisions are to be
found in article 4 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
The human rights conventions may thus also be applied in the event of
armed conflicts. Where a conflict does not threaten the life of the nation,
which may be the case when a State carries out limited military opera-
tions on the territory of another, all provisions of the human rights
conventions are applicable, side by side with international humanitarian
law.
For a long time no attention was paid to the relations between those
two branches of international law. It was only towards the end of the
1960's, with the outbreak of a succession of armed conflicts at this period
—wars of national liberation in Africa, the Middle East conflict, the wars
in Nigeria and Viet Nam—in which aspects of the law of war and aspects
of human rights arose at the same time, that people became conscious
of the relationship. At the International Conference on Human Rights,
convened in 1968 by the United Nations at Teheran, a link was officially
established between human rights and international humanitarian law.
In its resolution XXIII adopted on 12 May 1968 and entitled "Respect
for human rights in armed conflicts", the Conference urged the better
application of existing conventions in armed conflicts and the conclusion
of further agreements. This resolution initiated United Nations action on
international humanitarian law, as may be witnessed in the Secretary-
General's annual reports and the resolutions adopted every year by the
General Assembly. It was the impulse given at Teheran which led the
States to consider in a favourable light the development of the Geneva
Conventions, whereas the "Draft rules for the limitation of the dangers
incurred by the civilian population in time of war" presented by the
International Committee of the Red Cross in 1956 had failed to elicit any
comparable response.
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The influence of human rights had an impact on the content of the
two 1977 Protocols, several of whose provisions, for example article 75
of Protocol I (Fundamental guarantees) and article 6 of Protocol II
(Penal prosecutions), are directly derived from the United Nations Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.
The convergence of international humanitarian law and human
rights shows that war and peace, civil wars and international conflicts,
international law and internal law, all have increasingly overlapping
areas. It follows that the law of war and the law of peace, international
law and internal law, the scopes of which were at first clearly distinct, are
today often applicable at the same time side by side. Thus, the Geneva
Conventions and the human rights conventions may often be applied in
cumulative fashion.
Maintenance of separate human rights conventions
and international humanitarian law conventions
We have seen that human rights and international humanitarian law
overlap to a certain extent. Does that imply that once the conventions
on human rights have been universally ratified they will supersede the
law of Geneva and the law of The Heague ? Evidently not, and in support
of this assertion, we shall distinguish between two things: first, the degree
of concordance of substantive rules in the two groups of conventions
and second, the efficiency of the machinery of supervision and of sanc-
tions provided for in each group.
Concordance of substantive rules
The Geneva Conventions appear to offer the victims of armed con-
flicts greater protection than do the human rights conventions because
they are better suited to the circumstances.
Most provisions of the human rights conventions were elaborated
without taking into account the special conditions met with in armed
conflicts. This is noticable, for example, in the United Nations Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights which protects only persons within the terri-
tory of a State Party to the Covenant (article 2, para. 1) but not those
outside that territory who, in the case of an international armed conflict,
would be equally in need of its protection. It is significant, too, that
article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights lists the cases
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when a person may be deprived of his liberty but omits to mention the
capture of prisoners of war and internment of persons on grounds of
security. Furthermore, the provisions concerning the human rights
guarantees and their limits would not be sufficient in the case of armed
conflict. The following examples will suffice to show that the Geneva
Conventions offer protected persons protection which is more extensive
and better suited to armed conflict situations than that offered by human
rights conventions.
The right to life is among the first rights referred to in those conven-
tions (article 6 of the United Nations Covenant; article 2 of the European
Convention; article 4 of the American Convention), qualified by some
exceptions such as capital punishment or homicide in self-defence. A
more specific definition is needed in armed conflicts, since the killing of
enemy military personnel is considered to be a legitimate act. So the
Geneva Conventions (and their 1977 Protocols) and the Hague Conven-
tions forbid violence to the life of all protected persons (the wounded,
the sick, prisoners of war, civilian persons); they likewise forbid the
killing or murder of enemy persons who have laid down their arms,
have surrendered or are defenceless. The prohibition is also extended to
attacks on persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress, indiscriminate
attacks, all acts intended to starve civilians, the destruction of objects
and installations indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
etc. The right to life in armed conflicts would not be sufficiently regulated
without such details.
The human rights conventions next guarantee the right to personal
liberty. Here, too, they specify some exceptions, in particular the restric-
tion of freedom following a criminal offence. They also forbid slavery
and, subject to certain reservations, forced labour (articles 8 and 9 of
the United Nations Covenant; articles 4 and 5 of the European Conven-
tion ; articles 6 and 7 of the American Convention). These rights are,
however, defined also in the humanitarian conventions applicable in
armed conflicts. In particular, the taking of hostages and the deportation
of civilians are prohibited; more detailed rules are laid down with regard
to restrictions to the liberty of prisoners of war, the retention of medical
personnel by an enemy, the internment of civilians of enemy nationality,
the right to compel prisoners of war and enemy civilians to do work, and
related questions.
It would not be difficult to demonstrate by further examples that the
humanitarian conventions contain more extensive and more precise
provisions for the protection of individuals in armed conflicts than the
human rights conventions. Generally speaking, this is also true for non-
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international armed conflicts. It is true that common article 3 does not
offer more than the "immutable core" of the human rights conventions
but Protocol II of 1977 lists a wider range of rights.
However, it is not the sole task of the law of armed conflicts to adapt
certain human rights to the special situations of armed conflicts. It goes
further for it lays down rules which lie outside the scope of human rights;
conversely, the human rights conventions contain rules which are irrele-
vant to armed conflicts. In other words, the law of armed conflicts and
human rights only partially overlap. The former, for instance, governs
the right to take part in the fighting, the conduct of military operations,
the conduct of economic warfare, in particular in naval war, and relations
between belligerent States and neutral States. Such questions would
have no place in human rights conventions, which in their turn, provide
for rights which are of no importance in armed conflicts, for example,
political rights or certain political freedoms, such as freedom of the press,
freedom of expression, freedom of association.
Supervision and sanctions machinery
While the content of international humanitarian law coincides in
part with that of the human rights conventions, they have different pro-
visions regarding their supervision and sanctions machinery.
The Geneva Conventions are applied with the cooperation and under
the supervision of the Protecting Powers and of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, whose representatives are entitled to go to all
places where prisoners of war or protected civilian persons may be and
to interview them without witnesses. Their reports and recommendations
are confidential; this measure encourages States to agree to such visits.
As a general rule, appropriate action is taken on the recommendations
and requests in the reports.
In an international conflict, the parties are obliged to admit super-
visory bodies, but in the case of armed conflict not of an international
character an impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may only offer its services to the parties
to the conflict. On the other hand, the ICRC may, in both international
and non-international conflicts, take any initiative to protect persons
affected by the conflict. It avails itself of this right of initiative in all
armed conflicts, to bring material assistance, to exchange prisoners of
war, and to request permission to visit persons deprived of their liberty.
With regard to the repression of breaches, a particularity of the law
of armed conflicts is that its provisions, besides being binding on States,
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are also directly binding on individuals. The State may therefore punish
persons who have committed breaches, the legal basis being international
law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 require
the High Contracting Parties to provide penal sanctions for persons
committing grave breaches of the Conventions or Protocol and to bring
those persons to trial. The origin and the justification of penal guaran-
tees in the law of armed conflicts are derived from the fact that it is
primarily the members of the armed forces who have to apply the law
of war. Therefore, penal sanctions would be the most suitable means for
the repression of acts contrary to the law committed by military personnel.
On this point the difference between the law of war and the system of
human rights is fundamental. Where human rights are involved, it is
basically the injured parties themselves who have to institute proceedings
before the national courts and, if necessary, an international authority.
In international humanitarian law, legal actions by injured parties are
generally out of the question for two reasons: first, because legal pro-
ceedings are not appropriate to remedy breaches committed by soldiers
and, secondly, because international humanitarian law protects primarily
persons who, helpless and defenceless, normally would be in no position
to resort to any legal process, whether national or international. The
implementation of the humanitarian conventions is therefore better
secured by the intervention of a neutral body, acting independently, and
by complementary penal sanctions.
The human rights conventions provide that either the High Contrac-
ting States or the individuals whose rights have been infringed may
lodge a complaint against the State which has committed the breach.
The European Convention lays down that a High Contracting State
may present a petition without restriction but that individuals do not
have that right unless the State concerned has issued a specific declaration
to that effect. In contrast, the American Convention allows the High
Contracting States to present petitions on condition that they have
published a statement to that effect, but individuals may do so in any
case. In the United Nations Covenant, the procedure for petitions (here
called "communications") is more limited. Communications by States
may be received and considered only if both the plaintiff State and the
defendant State have made a special declaration, which may be with-
drawn at any time. Communications from individuals may be received
and considered only if the State concerned is a party to the Optional
Protocol annexed to the Covenant. This Protocol may be denounced
at any time by a State Party and the denunciation takes effect three
months after its notification.
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Because of its optional character and the short period of time allowed
for denunciation, the utility of the procedure in the United Nations
Covenant is restricted in cases of armed conflict. The procedures in the
European and American Conventions, not being subjected to any
suspension in time of emergency, can play a more meaningful role in
time of conflict, provided the work of the competent courts is not brought
to a standstill by the war. They could be of great utility in conflicts not
of an international character; in such cases there are no provisions for
the institution of Protecting Powers, and the ICRC's offer of services
may be refused. The procedures in the human rights conventions are,
however, cumbersome—they might take several years—but the publicity
attending them might serve as a substantial deterrent.
The supervision machinery of these two types of conventions can be
fairly easily brought into action in a cumulative way, as their procedures
are quite different, as a rule. Supervision by the ICRC or by a Protecting
Power is much more swift and more direct than the system laid down in
the human rights conventions; the latter, depending on circumstances,
may even become superfluous. One can, however, imagine situations in
which human rights agencies may act more efficiently than the ICRC,
especially when they are empowered, as is the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, to take action on their own initiative. When,
in 1965, the Dominican Republic was in the throes of civil war, the
Inter-American Commission, which already existed then, was very
active, visiting interned persons. This it did in agreement with the ICRC
delegates who were in the country, and the two organizations split
their tasks between them and carried out their operations in such a
way as to avoid overlapping.
Conclusions
After the Second World War, the idea that human rights should be
guaranteed worldwide gathered momentum and not only led to the
conclusion of conventions on human rights but also gave a vigorous
impulse to humanitarian law. Without the impetus of human rights,
the adoption of the two Protocols of 1977 additional to the Geneva
Conventions would not have been possible. It is therefore right to say
that there is a close relationship between those two branches of interna-
tional law and that it is necessary to reconcile them. Nevertheless,
human rights and humanitarian law must each constitute the subject
of separate treaties. Armed conflicts require rules which are more precise
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than and partly different from those that are necessary in time of peace.
In addition, the provisions of humanitarian law must be supplemented by
rules relative to the conduct of hostilities. Such rules are outside the
sphere of human rights and, therefore, have to be dealt with separately.
It is likewise desirable that the supervision of the application of the
human rights conventions should not be entrusted to the same bodies
which supervise the humanitarian conventions. The mediation of
Protecting Powers or of the ICRC, the visits to places of detention and
the communication of confidential reports produce, in time of armed
conflict, better results than formal complaints, which are usually possible
only in peace-time, when individuals have free access to national and
international authorities competent and able to enquire into allegations,
institute conciliation procedure and issue judgements based on law. When
the procedures specified by one or the other type of agreement can func-
tion simultaneously, that is not a disadvantage: it can but strengthen
the protection of the persons concerned.
There is a further reason why separate rules are desirable for human
rights, on the one hand, and the law of armed conflicts, on the other;
namely that the humanitarian conventions are more widely accepted
than the human rights conventions. The law of armed conflicts concerns
questions which have for a long time been dealt with by international
law. The parties have generally a reciprocal interest in its application.
On the other hand, human rights were until recently—and indeed to a
large extent are still—considered as forming a part of the domestic law
of States. Much more than the law of armed conflicts, human rights are
affected by the diversity of the concepts of the State and by ideological
antagonisms. The adoption of the two 1977 Protocols additional to the
Geneva Conventions is a proof that a separate set of rules for armed
conflicts is in fact what States want.
For all the reasons set out above, the International Committee of
the Red Cross can still make a contribution of paramount importance
to the promotion of human rights. It does so by ensuring the application
of existing humanitarian conventions and their development and by
taking, independently of those Conventions, appropriate measures for
the protection of all persons affected by armed conflicts or internal
troubles.
Dietrich SCHINDLER
Professor at the Faculty of Law,
Zurich University,
Member of the ICRC Legal Commission
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